







A[n explicit intentional] dogwhistle is a speech act designed, with intent, to allow 
two plausible interpretations, with one interpretation being a private, coded 
message targeted for a subset of the general audience, and concealed in such a 
way that this general audience is unaware of the existence of the second, coded 
interpretation. (Witten: 2) 
Although the main interest of dogwhistles lies in their political use, Witten rightly 
argues that the concept applies more broadly.  As a parent, I was shocked to revisit 
some of my favourite childhood entertainments and see much that I had missed as a 
child.  Watching Bugs Bunny with my small son, I was surprised to see references to 
old movies that children couldn’t be expected to know, and even more surprised to 
see that one of these was Last Tango in Paris.  Finding these references of course 
made the endless re-viewings less tedious.  And, of course, this was the intent of their 
makers.  Witten suggests that this should be considered a dogwhistle—a concealed 




Yet there's power, wonder-working power, in the goodness and idealism and faith 
of the American people. (Noah 2004) 
																																																								2	Witten	discusses	different	examples,	but	the	idea	of	dogwhistles	for	parents	in	children’s	entertainment	is	hers.	
To a non-fundamentalist this is an ordinary piece of fluffy political boilerplate, which 
passes without notice.  But a fundamentalist Christian will hear the dogwhistle.  
Amongst fundamentalists, “wonder- working power” is a favoured phrase that refers 
specifically to the power of Christ.  There are two messages a fundamentalist might 
take from this.  The first is a kind of translation into their idiolect, to yield an 
explicitly Christian message that would alienate many: 
Yet there's power, the power of Christ, in the goodness and idealism and faith of 
the American people.3 
The second is simply the fact that Bush does speak their idiolect—indicating that he is 
one of them. 
 
The first message is very clearly an explicit intentional dogwhistle: it is a coded, 
concealed message, intended for just a subgroup of the general audience.  In fact, it 
functions rather like the exploitation of a little-known ambiguity.  The second is a 
little messier.  It is somewhat like speaking in a regional accent that gives a feeling of 
kinship to a particular audience.  But it’s crucially different because, unlike an accent, 
it can’t be heard by everyone.  Arguably, then (assuming that it is done intentionally), 
this is still an explicit intentional dogwhistle—it is a coded message for a subgroup, 

















2.2.2 ‘Inner	City’		In	the	United	States,	‘inner	city’	has	come	to	function	as	a	dogwhistle	for	black.		Thus,	politicians	who	would	be	rebuked	if	they	called	for	harsher	measures	against	black	criminals	can	safely	call	for	cracking	down	on	inner	city	crime.		Psychologists	have	studied	the	effects	of	the	phrase	“inner	city”,	and	it	seems	to	function	very	similarly	to	the	Willie	Horton	ad.	Horwitz	and	Peffley	(2005)	randomly	assigned	subjects	to	two	groups,	with	one	group	being	asked	question	A	below,	and	one	group	being	asked	question	B	(difference	underlined	by	me,	from	102-3).		 A. Some	people	want	to	increase	spending	for	new	prisons	to	lock	up	violent	criminals.	Other	people	would	rather	spend	this	money	for	antipoverty	programs	to	prevent	crime.	What	about	you?	If	you	had	to	choose,	would	








TABLE 1. Transcripts of Implicit Race Cue Advertising 
Manipulation 















































































When the black racial cues are stereotype-inconsistent, however, the 
relationship between racial attitudes and the vote disappears... Violating 
racial stereotypes with positive images of blacks dramatically 
undermines racial priming. The presence of black images alone, 
therefore, does not prime negative racial attitudes. The effect emerges 
only when the pairing of the visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces 
negative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer. 
This is a crucial point, as it raises another possible way of combatting the 
influence of implicit dogwhistles.  It shows that it is possible to discuss 
government spending without priming racial attitudes.  But avoiding racial 
imagery is not the way to do this—instead, one must make a concerted effort to 
include the right racial imagery.  The right racial imagery will be 
counterstereotypical imagery that can serve to undermine the dogwhistles 																																																								9	This	sort	of	concern	is	very	important	to	Stanley	(2015).	
(primary or secondary) that would otherwise be present (whatever one’s 
intentions).  This requires awareness and effort on the part of the speaker, who 
might otherwise think that they have avoided triggering racial attitudes by 
avoiding overtly racial imagery or words.  (See the table below, from Valentino 
































































































“Intuitively, the whole point of insinuation – what defines it and makes it 
rhetorically useful – is that it involves off-record communication: the speaker 
means (and when successful, communicates) something without putting it on 
the conversational record. If this is right, then the very existence of insinuation 
demonstrates that we can’t simply equate what a speaker means with her 
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Comment [1]: Check	this.	
When the news media connects images of urban Blacks repeatedly with 
mentions of the term “welfare,” the term “welfare” comes to have not-at-issue 
content that Blacks are lazy. (Stanley: 138) 
Stanley also suggests that the not-at-issue effect of a term can take the form of a 
preference ordering, taking the form of a ranking of groups in terms of worthiness 
of respect.  So, a term may cause those who encounter it to rank groups 
differently, in a way that erodes respect for some groups. One might even come to 
rank groups as worthy of more or less empathy, which for Stanley is an especially 
important sort of not-at-issue effect. 
 
Stanley’s approach is able to accommodate the way that audiences may be 
unaware of what is really going on in an implicit dogwhistle utterance.  Not-at-
issue content is (sometimes) entered into the common ground without an 
audience’s explicit awareness that this is taking place: this is a key part of what 
makes it so insidious. 
 
Nonetheless, Stanley’s approach does not accommodate all that psychologists 
have taught us about how these utterances work.  Stanley suggests that words like 
‘welfare’ erode respect for black people either by carrying a not-at-issue content 
that black people are lazy or causing people to implement a preference ranking 
according to which black people are less deserving of empathy than white people 
are.  Moreover, he suggests that this cannot be cancelled, and that it will be 
present in every use of a term like ‘welfare’.12  But this fails to fit with the data in 
certain key ways.   
 
The first problem is that the use of implicit dogwhistle terms like ‘welfare’ or 
even the viewing of advertisements like the Willie Horton ads do not (in general) 
cause changes in racial attitudes.13  Instead, they make accessible pre-existing 																																																								12	He	does	allow	for	the	possibility	of	change	over	time,	but	only	when	there	is	“sufficient	control	of	the	media	and	other	instruments	of	power”	(162)	by	those	advocating	a	change.		He	does	not	allow	for	conversation-by-conversation	variation.	13	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	the	worry	I	am	raising	here	is	specific	to	the	claim	that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	changes	in	racial	attitudes,	based	on	specific	study	of	these	utterances.		I	am	not	at	all	skeptical	about	the	general	idea	of	linguistic	
attitudes, and bring them to bear on issues where they might not otherwise have 
played a role in decision-making. This is quite different from Stanley’s picture, on 
which the terms either cause new claims to be added to the common ground, or 
cause changes in people’s preference rankings14.   
 
The second problem is related to this one.  It is that the effects of implicit 
dogwhistle terms are not quite so monolithically negative as Stanley takes them to 
be.  We can see this either intuitively or by looking at the empirical evidence.  
Intuitively, we can imagine a black speaker addressing a left-wing black audience 
and saying “My mother was on welfare while she did the engineering degree that 
lifted our family out of poverty”.  This use of ‘welfare’ will not carry any 
suggestion that black people are lazy, nor will it erode respect for black people.  If 
we prefer to look back on the empirical data, we can return to the findings 
discussed earlier.  Adding  ‘inner city’ to the question about prison funding caused 
those low in racial resentment to be less likely to agree that more prisons should 
be built.  Pre-existing racial attitudes—whatever they are—are activated by 
implicit racial dogwhistle terms.  If the attitudes are racially resentful, then there is 
likely to be an outcome that indeed fits with a lack of respect for black people.  
But if the attitudes are not racially resentful, the outcome is likely to be entirely 
different. 
 
Finally, challenging a dogwhistle successfully may not be as difficult as Stanley 
suggests.  The priming of racial resentment only works if it remains implicit.  If a 
dogwhistle term like ‘welfare’ is used but race is made explicit, the effect 
vanishes.  Recall also that as soon as Jesse Jackson raised the issue of race, the 
																																																																																																																																																														utterances	causing	changes	in	attitudes—indeed	I	think	this	is	widespread.		Nor	am	I	even	sceptical	about	the	idea	that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	some	changes	in	attitudes:	After	all,	viewing	the	Willie	Horton	ad	caused	many	voters	to	change	their	voting	intentions	and	their	beliefs	about	who	was	the	best	candidate.	
14 Some of Stanley’s claims are also at odds with the idea that dogwhistles alter attitudes.  For example, 
he writes, “As Tali Mendelberg shows, stereotypes of black Americans have remained 
constant throughout the history of the Republic.” (135) 	
Willie Horton ad ceased to be effective. But the fact that it sometimes does shows 













Goodin and Saward hold that a mandate to rule is not undermined in this way, 
because everybody who votes for politician P knows exactly what they are 
voting for: that politician P should rule. 
A conservative party dog-whistles an encouraging message to racists 
that its own traditional supporters would instantly repudiate. It wins the 
ensuing election. Half its voters voted for it purely because of its 
(coded) support for racist policies; half voted for it purely because of its 
traditionally decent policies on race. Clearly, the party won a majority; 
clearly, it has a mandate to rule. But under those circumstances, it 
equally clearly could not claim a policy mandate to pursue either of the 
two contradictory policies that won it its votes. (2005: 475) 
Goodin and Saward argue, then that a party cannot claim a mandate for its policies 
unless it refrains from engaging in dogwhistle politics (and more than this may be 
needed as well): It	is	worth	firmly	reminding	political	parties	that	when	they	engage	in	dog	whistle	politics	in	ordinary	general	elections,	the	same	phenomenon	that	they	are	counting	on	to	increase	their	share	of	votes	also	undercuts	the	authority	that	they	might	secure	by	winning	the	vote.	(2005:	476)	
It seems to me, however, that Goodin and Saward’s arguments do not go quite far 
enough.  If they are right about the policy mandate, then the mandate to rule may also 
often be undermined.  This will happen, for example, in the case of single-issue 
voters, of which there are likely to be many.  If a voting decision is based on abortion 
policy, and different messages are sent about this to different groups of voters, then 
surely the mandate to rule is also—in any meaningful sense—undermined. 
Now let’s turn to the case of implicit dogwhistles, which Goodin and Saward don’t 
discuss.  Implicit dogwhistles don’t involve the same sort of deception.  It’s not the 
case that some viewers of the Willie Horton ad will think that Dukakis’s prison policy 
is Q, while others will take it to be R.  What will happen, however, is that the ad’s 
target audience will vote for Bush on the basis of their racial attitudes, without 
realizing it.  Human psychology being what it is, being unaware of one’s reason for 
making a voting decision is surely widespread.  People are unaware of the extent to 
which, for example, their decision of which socks to buys is based on the location of 
the socks on the table.  It stands to reason that people would be unaware of the degree 
to which they are influenced by music in a commercial, subtleties of tone or body 
language, being reminded of a loved (or hated!) one, and so on.  If such lack of 
awareness of influences were enough to undermine democratic authority, we would 
need to give up all hope of democracy. 
However, more than this goes on with implicit dogwhistles.  In implicit dogwhistle 
cases, people make decisions on the basis of reasons that they would reject if they 
became aware of them—as we know from what happens when they are raised to 
consciousness.  Moreover, they do this as a result of being deliberately manipulated. 
This looks, on the face of it, much more like a threat to democratic mandates.   
But if this is sufficient to undermine a mandate, then once more there may in fact be 
no mandates.  What voter, after all, thinks that they should base their vote on music 
played during a campaign commercial, or on a candidate’s physical appearance?  And 
yet, all that we know about psychology suggests that factors like these are sure to 
impact voter choices.  And all that we know about the running of campaigns (and 
about advertising more generally) tells us that things like this are bound to be used by 
campaign operatives to deliberately manipulate the voters.  Being influenced by 
factors that we don’t think should influence us is, it seems to me, an inevitable part of 
the human condition.  And, since this is relatively widely known, using such factors to 
influence others will also be a standard feature of human life.  If this is sufficient to 
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